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Litigating to Regulate: Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency
Andrew P. Morriss*
I. Introduction
By a 5-4 vote in Massachusetts v. Environmental ProtectionAgency,'
the Supreme Court took yet another significant step away from the
Framers' vision of the judiciary and toward a politicized Supreme
Court sitting as a super-legislature and super-regulator. The Court
substituted its judgment for that of the politically accountable
branches of the federal government. By dramatically loosening the
rules of standing, the Court invited those unhappy with the federal
government's failure to regulate in a particular manner in any substantive area to use the federal courts to force federal agencies to
regulate. In short, the Court encouraged interest groups to seek to
obtain from the courts what they could not from agencies or Congress. The Court rolled out the welcome mat for state governments
unhappy with a federal agency's decision, creating from whole cloth
a new rule of standing that allows states to gain a hearing in federal
court with only the thinnest of allegations of harm. In doing so, the
Court undermined the legal rules of standing. The majority also
supported its decision with a one-sided and unsophisticated account
of the scientific evidence for the petitioners' claims concerning climate change, needlessly inserting the courts into a scientific dispute
that, as the majority's opinion demonstrated, they are woefully
unprepared to handle.
Unfortunately Massachusetts v. EPA is but one piece of a broader
trend toward regulation through litigation. A wide range of interest
*Professor of Law and Economics at Case Western Reserve University. Thanks to
Jonathan H. Adler, Benjamin D. Cramer, and Roger E. Meiners for comments on an
earlier draft. All errors remain, of course, my responsibility.
1127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
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groups, including state politicians, private interest groups, and federal regulators, is increasingly using the courts as a vehicle to impose
regulatory measures the interest groups cannot obtain from legislatures and agencies.2 The usual regulatory process has many flaws,
but it at least incorporates a measure of political accountability. By
shifting key aspects of regulatory decision-making to the courts,
these interest groups are finding ways to deflect responsibility for
the costs imposed by the regulatory state. By doing so in a way that
provides only a means to increase regulatory agencies' activity and
jurisdiction, the courts' acquiescence in regulation by litigation further erodes the constraints on regulators, giving them (and interest
groups that favor increased regulation) a second chance on those
occasions when they lose in the political process.
II. The Decision
The substantive dispute at the heart of Massachusetts v. EPA was
straightforward. Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act requires that
the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
"shall by regulation prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause,
or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare."' In October 1999, a group of
nineteen organizations ranging from Greenpeace USA to the Network for Environmental and Economic Responsibility of the United
Church of Christ filed a petition with EPA, requesting that the agency
initiate rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles under that section. Before formulating the response
required by law, EPA sought and received extensive public comment on the petition and obtained a report on the science of
climate change from the National Research Council of the National

2
See Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Regulation by Litigation
(Yale University Press, forthcoming 2008); Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle &
Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 29 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 179 (2005);
Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Regulation by Litigation: The
EPA's Regulation of Heavy Duty Diesel Engines, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 403 (2004);
Regulation Through Litigation (W. Kip Viscusi, ed. 2002).
'42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
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Academy of Sciences. After considering the matter, the agency
decided in 2003 against issuing a rule, concluding that it lacked
statutory authority to do so.' In addition, EPA determined that even
if it had authority to regulate mobile source emissions of greenhouse
gases, rulemaking on motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions alone
would be imprudent because it would fragment government policy
toward emissions and impede negotiations with other countries over
a global approach to climate change.
The interest groups, now joined by twelve states' and local and
territorial governments,7 appealed EPA's decision to the D.C. Circuit.
The three judge panel in that court produced three opinions, two
of which supported upholding EPA's decision (albeit on different
grounds) and one of which favored overturning the agency decision
not to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions as arbitrary
and capricious. Most of the unsuccessful petitioners then sought
review of the decision in the Supreme Court. A variety of interest
groups and ten states' supported EPA's position on one ground or
another before the Supreme Court (including the Cato Institute).
The case presented two questions for the Supreme Court. First,
did any of the organizations, states, or local governments complaining about EPA's failure to regulate have standing to seek review of
the agency's decision in the courts? Standing is a component of
Article III's limitation of the federal courts' jurisdiction to "Cases"
and "Controversies."10 Standing's requirement that a petitioner seeking to overturn an agency action must demonstrate that the agency's
action "injures him in a concrete and personal way"n was a difficult
hurdle to overcome for those who simply objected to an agency's
'National Research Council, Climate Change: An Analysis of Some Key Questions (2001).
'Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial
of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922 (Sept. 8, 2003).
6
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
'The District of Columbia, American Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore.
'Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
9
Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,
Texas, and Utah.
10U.S. Const., Art. III.
1
" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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policy choices. And because global climate change is by definition
a global phenomenon, standing posed a serious obstacle to the petitioners. Indeed, one of the opinions in the D.C. Circuit had rejected
their claim on precisely this ground. To reach the merits of the case,
the Supreme Court had to find that at least one of the petitioners
who objected to EPA's decision had standing to object to EPA's
refusal to regulate. Second, if at least one of the petitioners did have
standing, there was a serious question about whether the Court
should disturb the agency's decision not to regulate. Under the
Supreme Court's decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,12 federal courts are to defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute absent a clear congressional
intent. In other words, if an agency interprets a statute in a reasonable
way, the courts should not substitute their own construction for that
of the agency. The petitioners were on firmer ground here than they
were on standing. However, as a plausible decision could have
upheld the agency's decision not to regulate, they were by no means
assured of success even if they prevailed on the standing issue, if
the Court applied Chevron."
The Court divided 5-4 on both questions. The majority (Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, and Stevens), in an opinion by
Justice Stevens, found in favor of the petitioners on both the standing
issue (by holding that Massachusetts, at least, had standing) and
the merits." In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by the remaining
three (Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas), rejected Massachusetts's
claims on standing grounds. In a second dissenting opinion, joined in
by the same four, Justice Scalia examined and rejected the petitioners'
claims on the merits.
12467

3

U.S. 837 (1984).

" The courts' application of Chevron has been uneven from the start. See Peter H.
Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984 (1991); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on
Chevron: An Empirical Study on the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
15 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (1998); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron,
State Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 Envtl. L. Rep.
10376 (2001). Amici, including the Cato Institute, also offered non-Chevron-based
arguments that supported the decision not to regulate.
"One of the ironies of the case is that Justice Stevens is the author of the Chevron
opinion. Deference to agencies apparently only matters to him when he agrees with
the results.
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III. The Majority
Justice Stevens opened the majority opinion with a remarkably
one-sided summary of the scientific evidence on climate change.
From the first sentences-"A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe
the two trends are related." 1"-through the remainder of the opinion,
a reader who was not acquainted with the debate over climate
change would be hard pressed to realize that there is considerable
disagreement over virtually every aspect of the issue.16 And a reader
of Justice Stevens's opinion could be forgiven for not knowing that
there was debate over how to best approach climate change within
the political branches. Stevens's summary of congressional and presidential attention to climate change issues barely mentioned the unanimous Senate resolution opposing the Kyoto Protocol from 1997.17
Stevens's selective account had a purpose. The petitioners' standing problem stemmed from the requirement, as articulated in the
1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, that a litigant must
show a "concrete and particularized" injury that is "actual or imminent," that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant, and that
a favorable decision will redress the injury.'" If climate change was
less than certain, it would hamper the standing claim by making it
hard to show an "actual or imminent" injury. By avoiding any of
the uncertainties about the petitioners' claims concerning climate
change, Stevens strengthened their claim to have standing.
The problem was not solved by assuming a resolution to the
scientific debate, however. A global change in climate over decades,
"sMassachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).
16
See, e.g., Robert M. Carter, C. R. de Freitas, Indur M. Goklany, David Holland
& Richard S. Lindzen, Climate Change: Climate Science and the Stem Review, 8
World Economics 161 (April-June 2007); Fraser Institute, Independent Summary for
Policymakers: IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007).
17
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). Even accepting the petitioners' scientific
claims, Stevens's opinion is still inaccurate scientifically. See Jonathan H. Adler, Justice
Stevens' Scientific Mistake, The Volokh Conspiracy (April 4, 2007), available at http://
www.volokh.com/posts/1175698890.shtml (visited August 13, 2007). No doubt Stevens would have found standing even if he had not made this error, but the lack of
scientific literacy in the opinion underscores the problematic nature of relying on
courts to evaluate such claims.
1
sLujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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caused by emissions of greenhouse gases from sources spanning the
globe is difficult to characterize as a "particularized injury" that is
"fairly traceable" to EPA's failure to regulate one source of emissions
in the United States." Stevens solved this piece of the standing
problem with a clever move, one so clever none of the parties or
amici had discussed it in their briefs.20 He reached back to a 1907
case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,2 1 which involved a common
law nuisance suit by the state of Georgia against a polluter in Tennessee. The decision in that case recognized Georgia's interest in protecting its citizens from the ill-effects of air pollution caused in Tennessee. Massachusetts's case was stronger than Georgia's, Justice Stevens concluded, because Massachusetts owned considerable coastal
property it alleged was threatened by rising sea levels as a result of
climate change. If Georgia could complain about the smelter in
Tennessee harming Georgia's citizens' property, Stevens reasoned,
surely Massachusetts could complain about EPA's failure to prevent
greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources from causing sea
levels to rise and land owned by the state to flood. Stevens's interpretation of Tennessee Copper is wrong-the case has nothing to do with
standing and Stevens's attempted analogy falls flat.
The final standing issue was whether the remedy sought by Massachusetts and the other states-regulation of mobile source greenhouse gas emissions-would "redress" the injury. In other words,
if EPA regulated mobile source greenhouse gas emissions, what
would happen? Would regulating mobile source emissions of greenhouse gases prevent the harms alleged by Massachusetts? Only if
the state could show that EPA regulation would reduce the harm
it suffered would the state have standing under Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife. As U.S. mobile source emissions constitute less than a

19
The Cato amicus brief argued that the "particularized injury" claimed by Massachusetts (the flooding of state coastal property) was not in "imminent" danger, as
the flooding would not occur until far in the future. Relying on distant harms to
make the alleged harm particular had the effect of eviscerating the imminent portion
of the test. See Brief of the Cato Institute and Law Professors Jonathan H. Adler,
James L. Huffman, and Andrew P. Morriss as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
2006 WL 3043962, at *9-*12 (2006).
20
Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 Va. L. Rev. In
Brief 61, 63 (2007).
21206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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third of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn constitute
only a fraction of world emissions,' reducing emissions by American
mobile sources would not seem likely to solve Massachusetts' problem since it would affect at most only six percent of total CO 2 emissions if all emissions from mobile sources ended, which no one claims
would happen. Justice Stevens then simply concluded: "[j]udged
by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful
contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according
to petitioners, to global warming."" That any potential regulation
would have such a small impact did not bother Stevens. For example,
he concluded that even if China and India increased their emissions
of greenhouse gases (as seems likely they will), reducing U.S. mobile
source emissions would "slow the pace of global emissions
increases."24 He therefore declared that Massachusetts had standing.
Unpacking Stevens's chain of reasoning reveals that the case held
that a rise in sea level of a few inches over a century was sufficient
to satisfy the requirement, effectively eliminating any substantive
content in the standing analysis.
Stevens accorded Massachusetts "special solicitude" in his analysis of standing.25 This weakening of standing rules for state governments is something new. The most limited government proponents
can hope for from this case is that these new, looser rules are
restricted to state governments and that there will be a return to
more rigorous standing analysis for private parties. But even limited
to state governments, the looser standing rules are problematic
because the loosening benefits are almost entirely available only to
those demanding additional regulation. Those who object to expanding a regulation for other than a purely philosophical reason could
already challenge an agency's action because the harm caused by
the regulatory expansion would suffice for standing. But the looser
standard for standing is a benefit for those objecting to the absence
of a regulation because it allows a state (and perhaps others) that can
make a minimally plausible claim that a regulation would mitigate a
harm to its interests to challenge the decision not to regulate.
22

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1468-69 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

23
24
25

Id. at 1457-58.
1d. at 1458.
Id. at 1454-55.
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Having found standing, Justice Stevens had little trouble finding
that EPA was required to act. EPA had determined that CO 2 was
not within the statutory definition of "air pollutant" and so it lacked
authority to regulate under the statute. Even if it had had such
authority, however, the agency had determined that it should not
act, because doing so would likely impede reducing greenhouse
gas emissions globally by hindering U.S. negotiations with other
countries' over their emissions and by fragmenting the domestic
approach to the issue.26
As it had on the standing issue, EPA appeared to be on firm
ground here for two reasons. First, greenhouse gas emissions make
a poor fit with the Clean Air Act's regulatory approach and history.
The Act was adopted to address what were primarily local air pollution problems 27 and expanded in 1990 to deal more extensively with
transboundary air pollution questions such as acid rain.' Nowhere
in the legislative history of the Act is there any evidence that the
statute was intended by Congress to address global air pollution
issues like climate change. Further, Congress had repeatedly
addressed climate change, both by authorizing and funding studies,
by encouraging "non-regulatory" measures to address greenhouse
gas emissions, and by the Senate's unanimous expression of disapproval of the Kyoto Accord in 1997.29 In all the various resolutions,
appropriations riders, and statutes on climate change issues passed
by Congress over the years, there has never been any indication that
anyone in Congress, for or against regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions, thought that the Clean Air Act already authorized EPA
to regulate those emissions. However, Justice Stevens rejected EPA's
(and the Cato Institute's) argument that this history suggested that
EPA was correctly interpreting Congress's intentions on its authority
with respect to those substances. "That subsequent Congresses have
eschewed enacting binding emissions limitations to combat global
warming tells us nothing about what Congress meant when it
26
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial
of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52931 (Sept. 8, 2003).
27
Adler, supra note 20, at 67.
28

See Gary C. Bryner, Blue Skies, Green Politics: The Clean Air Act of 1990 and Its
Implementation (1995).
29
That history is well summarized in the Cato Institute's amicus brief, in which I
participated. See Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 19, at *17-*24.
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amended [the relevant section] in 1970 and 1977."" Even if the Court
thought that the statute was ambiguous on this point, however,
under Chevron the courts are to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of an agency's organic statutes.
Apart from its impact in this case, Justice Stevens' action essentially limited an important recent Supreme Court precedent to its
facts, eliminating a key constraint on regulatory agencies. In Food
& Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,' the
Supreme Court had rejected the FDA's unilateral effort to assert
regulatory authority over cigarettes despite nearly a century of congressional refusal to grant the agency such authority.32 (The four
dissenters in that case were joined in Massachusettsv. EPA by Justice
Kennedy, who had disagreed with them in the earlier case, making
clear Kennedy's pivotal role on the court.)33
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Brown & Williamson and the parallels and distinctions from Justice Stevens's opinion
in Massachusettsv. EPA are instructive. Like Stevens, O'Connor noted
that there was a significant problem for which a regulatory solution
was proposed. After examining the history of the regulatory statute
in question, however, she concluded that Congress had precluded
the agency from acting, in part because Congress had repeatedly

"Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007). It seems likely that if Congress
thought anything about greenhouse gases in either 1970 or 1977, it probably thought
that they might be a good idea as the dominant climate change theory of the 1970s
was that the earth was cooling rather than warming. See, e.g., The Cooling World,
Newsweek (April 28, 1975) at 64 available at http://www.resiliencetv.fr/uploads/
newsweek.coolingworld.pdf ("The central fact is that after three quarters of a century
of extraordinarily mild conditions, the earth's climate seems to be cooling down.
Meteorologists disagree about the cause and extent of the cooling trend, as well as
over its specific impact on local weather conditions. But they are almost unanimous
in the view that the trend will reduce agricultural productivity for the rest of the
century.").
31529 U.S. 120 (2000).
32

For a detailed discussion of tobacco and regulation by litigation, see, Morriss,
Yandle & Dorchak, Regulation by Litigation, supra note 2, at Chapter 7; Bruce Yandle,
Joseph A. Rotondi, Andrew P. Morriss & Andrew Dorchak, Bootleggers, Baptists &
Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by Litigation, Univ. of Illinois Law and Economics
Research Paper No. LE07-021 (2007).
"See Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less
than Administrative Law: A Comment on Profs. Watts and Wildermuth, Case
Research Paper Series in Legal Studies Working Paper 07-20 (2007).
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declined to provide the agency with the authority it now asserted.
An important reason for O'Connor's conclusion was that if the FDA
did have authority over tobacco under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, it would have no choice but to ban tobacco products since they
could not be considered "safe" under the statute.M Since Congress
regularly enacted legislation that showed it accepted the legal sale
of cigarettes, O'Connor interpreted this legislative history as precluding the FDA's broad reinterpretation of its statutory authority.
Justice Stevens found that this reasoning did not apply to greenhouse gas emissions and the Clean Air Act for two reasons. First,
he suggested that the key to Brown & Williamson was that regulation
by the FDA would have led to a ban of tobacco. Since EPA action
in this case "would only regulateemissions" rather than ban vehicles,
the earlier case did not apply." Second, in the case of tobacco, the
FDA had for decades explicitly denied it had authority over tobacco.
Here, EPA had never formally addressed the issue of its authority
over greenhouse gases but EPA's general counsel had previously
claimed authority to regulate.36 This assertion is particularly pernicious, because agencies rarely have an incentive to make "consistent
and repeated" disclaimers of authority. In the case of tobacco, it
was only the tobacco industry's extraordinary political clout that
prompted such disclaimers. Stevens's reasoning thus protects only
powerful political interests able to cajole or coerce an agency into
disclaiming jurisdiction.
Worse, granting legal significance to self-serving statements by
agency counsel about expansive authority undercuts political
accountability. The public choice literature has long explained that
agency staff have strong incentives to pursue their agency's mission,
ranging from the personal (expanding their agency's jurisdiction
enhances their own careers) to the publicly-minded (staff who want
to further their agency's mission to help the public but are likely to
experience "tunnel vision" and thus focus narrowly on the importance of their mission to the exclusion of the government's broader
goals).37 In short, principal-agent problems are rampant in the relationship between agency staff and elected officials, even within an
I FDA

v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 134-39 (2000).

35127 S. Ct. at 1461.
36

Id.

37

See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971).
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administration. In this context, relying on staff statements concerning broadening agency authority creates a one-way ratchet for
expanding agency regulatory authority.
Justice Stevens concluded with a touch of false modesty. On
remand, EPA need not regulate greenhouse gases, it need merely
"ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute."38 But Stevens actually left EPA with almost no room to avoid a decision to
regulate mobile source greenhouse gas emissions, not just those to
which Section 202 applied, for the logic of Stevens's analysis extends
beyond that section. As Professor Adler noted earlier this year:
Without any further action by Congress, the regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under
Section 202 is a near absolute certainty, as is the regulation
of industrial and utility emissions under Section 111. Litigation to force the listing of carbon dioxide as a criteria air
pollutant, and requiring the establishment of a National
Ambient Air Quality Standard, such as those that exist for
ozone, particulates and other ambient pollutants, will not be
far behind. At this point, if not before, Congress will be
compelled to act."
IV. The Roberts Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion contesting the
majority's standing analysis, joined by Justices Alito, Scalia, and
Thomas. Roberts noted the scale of the change in the rules of standing
made by the majority. He also established that the majority's reliance
on Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. was not consistent with prior
treatment of that case or the opinion's facts. Rather than easing
standing rules for states, Roberts explained, Tennessee Copper raised
"an additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articulation of a 'quasisovereign interest' 'apart from the interests of particular private parties.'"" As Roberts noted, the irrelevance of Tennessee Copper to the
question presented in this case-prior to the majority's reinterpretation of it-is evidenced by the petitioners' failure to cite the case
before the Supreme Court or D.C. Circuit and its absence from the
"Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007).
39
Adler, supra note 20, at 71.
40127 S. Ct. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.
v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (emphasis added)).
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briefs of the many amici and the three opinions below. The chief
justice noted the irony in the majority's reformulation of standing,
a doctrine whose purpose is in part to ensure that the issues are
vigorously contested by parties with a real stake in the outcome,
based on an interpretation of Tennessee Copper that was never briefed
or argued by the parties.
Applying the "traditional" standing test, the chief justice argued
Massachusetts's allegations of loss of coastal land to rising seas was
not sufficient to satisfy the "particularized injury" portion of the
test for at least three reasons. First, "[tihe very concept of global
warming seems inconsistent with this particularization requirement" and "the redress petitioners seek is focused no more on them
than on the public generally-it is literally to change the atmosphere
around the world." Second, the claim that Massachusetts is losing
coastal land is based solely on a statement that rising sea levels
have already occurred, without any supporting detail. Third, the
declarations of experts on which the state relied also include evidence that Massachusetts's coast is gradually sinking anyway, an
alternative explanation for any loss that might have occurred or be
threatened that is not distinguished from the alleged loss from rising
sea levels. The result is "pure conjecture."42 All the state had to
offer in addition to these conjectures were computer models with
substantial error margins and timelines that placed much of the
harm over the course of a century. None of this would have been
sufficient under Lufan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
Further, the state's claim should have failed because of a lack of
connection between the remedy sought (regulation of mobile source
emissions) and the harm alleged (rising sea levels). Not only do
domestic mobile source emissions constitute only four percent of
global greenhouse gas emissions (six percent of C02 emissions), but
the regulations sought would apply only to new vehicles, reaching
maximum effect only as the fleet of vehicles turned over. Any reductions would initially come from only a small proportion of mobile
sources, and hence from a fraction of the four percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. "In light of the bit-part domestic new motor
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions have played in what petitioners
"Id. at 1467.
42

Id.

204

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency
describe as a 150-year global phenomenon, and the myriad additional factors bearing on petitioners' alleged injury-the loss of Massachusetts coastal land-the connection is far too speculative to establish
causation."'
Finally, the chief justice noted that eighty percent of greenhouse
gas emissions come from outside the United States and developments in other countries are likely to have the major impact on
overall greenhouse gas levels irrespective of U.S. controls. The majority had waved this problem away, essentially saying that any reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would mitigate the problem. Roberts was unwilling to do so, contending that Massachusetts should
have been required to show that regulation by EPA would be likely
to protect it from the loss of coastal land. Unfortunately for Massachusetts, he continued, there was an "evident mismatch between
the source of their alleged injury-catastrophic global warming-and
the narrow subject matter of the Clean Air Act provision at issue in
this suit. The mismatch suggests that petitioners' true goal for this
litigation may be more symbolic than anything else. The constitutional role of the courts, however, is to decide concrete cases-not to
serve as a convenient forum for policy debates.""
Despite its failure to garner five votes, the chief justice's dissent
is chiefly valuable as an example of how the traditional standing
doctrine would have applied to the facts of this case. The contrast
between its analysis and the more elastic standing test applied in
the majority opinion make clear the substantial differences in the
doctrine of standing that occurred as a result of Massachusettsv. EPA.
V. The Scalia Dissent
Justice Scalia joined the chief justice's dissent on standing but
authored his own (joined by the other three dissenters as well) to
address the merits of the claim. Here the dispute turned on the
words "in his judgment" in Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act,
which mandates that the EPA administrator "shall by regulation
prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant
from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
4

ld. at 1469.
"Id. at 1470.
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which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare." The majority focused on the public health and welfare
language, arguing that the administrator could consider only such
matters in making a decision about whether to regulate or not. Scalia
saw the decision as two phase: The administrator first has to decide
whether to make a decision about regulating a pollutant. Once he
decides to do so, then he makes a regulatory decision on the basis
of "public health and welfare." In the first phase, the administrator
may consider other factors, such as the impact on foreign policy and
on other departments. Even under the majority's analysis, Scalia
argued that EPA was justified in finding that the scientific uncertainty was too great to allow it to act now, pointing to extensive
material in the record suggesting that such uncertainty existed.
Scalia also contested the majority's interpretation of the term "air
pollutant" in the Clean Air Act. "Air pollutant" is defined as "any
air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any
physical, chemical, . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air."45 Engaging in a close grammatical
analysis of the statute's text, Scalia argued that this is a two part
definition. To be an air pollutant, a substance must be "an air pollutant agent or combination of such agents." The words after "including" do not define things that are air pollutants, they simply illustrate
things that may be air pollutants if those things are also air pollutant
agents. EPA had read the definition of "air pollutant" in this way
and Justice Scalia argued that the agency's view deserved deference
as a plausible interpretation of the statute under the Chevron
doctrine. 6
Justice Scalia's legal analysis of EPA's statutory position is the
type of careful textual analysis that is too often lacking in regulatory
matters. However, as Professor Adler has pointed out, EPA did not
refuse to make a judgment about the dangers of climate change but
instead made a judgment that it would not regulate.47 Since that
judgment was not based on the standard in Section 202, once the
Court had decided that greenhouse gases were included under Section 202 EPA was left vulnerable to a complaint that it had not
'142 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
46
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7
1 Adler, supra note 20, at 71.
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followed the statute. Why did EPA not make the more prudent
declaration that it was refusing to make a judgment on climate
change's risks? We can only speculate, but two explanations are
plausible. First, the decision was made in 2003, during the run up
to the 2004 election between President George W. Bush and Sen.
John Kerry. One of the Democrats' more pointed attacks on the Bush
Administration was that it was "anti-environment." A refusal by
EPA to affirm the gospel of climate change would have reinforced
this attack. If political considerations played any role in setting EPA's
strategy, they likely were seen as supporting a nuanced decision
that paid homage to climate change fears while avoiding regulation.
Second, to the extent that the decision was driven by EPA's analysis,
it seems likely that the agency's staff would have been concerned
with both pushing the agency toward regulation and preserving
the agency's powers. From their position, a disclaimer based on
prudential grounds would have been preferable to a "we don't
know" position as it would have allowed a later administration to
make a different decision by claiming circumstances had changed
rather than reversing a legal position. If the agency lost the lawsuit,
as it surely anticipated it might, it would find itself in the position
of having to regulate. Finding itself ordered to regulate was an
outcome that it is difficult to imagine the agency staff finding
unpleasant. Thus both the administration's and the agency's interests
were served by the approach EPA took, even though it undercut
the chances of the decision being upheld.
VI. Standing and Separation of Powers
For the Supreme Court, "[tlhe principle of separation of powers
was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia
in the summer of 1787."" Separation of powers does not accidentally
make it harder to address serious problems, it intentionally makes
it harder for the government to act in all cases including when there
are serious problems that a group thinks need to be addressed. The
point of deliberately making it harder for the government to act was
to check abuse of power; the price of checking abuse of power was

"Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
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that it became harder for the government to act even when there
was not an abuse.
Standing is a crucial part of the separation of powers because it
both protects the judiciary from being brought into disputes where
it has no role and protects the political branches from the judiciary
by limiting when the judiciary might interfere with decisions by the
political branches. The requirement of standing derives from Article
III's limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies," which restricts "the business of federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of resolution through the judicial process."49 There are
other important limits as well (e.g., the requirement that a matter
appealed to the courts be a final agency action), but standing's role
is critical to restricting the courts to their proper sphere.
Massachusettsv. EPA opens the door to many more suits by interest
groups, and by states in particular, dissatisfied with the outcome of
the political process. It opens a one way door toward expanding the
role of the federal government. Any individual or state actually
injured by a regulatory action already met the Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife test. The only beneficiaries of this decision are those who
object to government decisions not to regulate. The unequal nature
of the relaxation of the standing rules undermines the independence
of the political branches from the judiciary.
It is easy to understand why the Sierra Club or Greenpeace would
want EPA to regulate more; lobbying for more regulations is what
such groups do. It is less obvious why state governments would
want more federal regulation. The answer lies in the incentives
created by the Clean Air Act.
VII. The Politics of the Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act's structure plays a key role in the politics behind
the state efforts to push EPA to regulate mobile source emissions
of greenhouse gases. Two features are important. First, with respect
to the criteria pollutants, the federal government determines the
overall levels of air pollution acceptable and selects the pollution
control technologies required to be used by various industries. Once
the EPA has set these standards, states get to figure out how to
49

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
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meet them and implement specific restrictions on stationary sources
within their borders through state implementation plans (SIPs). SIPs
are massive technical documents for which the operative unit of
measurement is "filing cabinets."" Many states' SIPs lack indices;
most portions of a SIP are incomprehensible to the non-specialist.
The result is that the key details of air pollution control-how the
burden of reducing pollution is allocated among sources-are
opaque to the general public. Federal regulation thus creates valuable rights to be distributed by state environmental agencies through
their SIPs. Of course, requiring regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources under Section 202 would not by itself
trigger the listing of those gases as criteria pollutants. As noted
earlier, however, the Court's decision leaves little room for EPA to
avoid such a listing and the victorious interest groups certainly see
this decision as the first step in a broader assault on greenhouse gas
emissions under existing provisions of the Clean Air Act."
Further, EPA bases its analysis of states' compliance with the
national standards using computer models of emissions.5 2 The models contain important assumptions about the environment and about
government regulation, assumptions that do not always match reality. In a conflict between model and reality, the model trumpswhat matters from a state's point of view is what EPA says the
state's emission levels are." An important goal of the litigation in
"See Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act in Political Environmentalism 263 (Terry L. Anderson, ed. 2000).
"See, e.g., EarthJustice, Press Release: High Court Rules Clean Air Act Gives EPA
Authority to Fight Global Warming (April 2, 2007) ("To combat this most urgent
environmental crisis, strong and comprehensive U.S. action is crucial. EPA must use
its existing Clean Air Act authority to require control of greenhouse gas emissionsby motor vehicles (the subject of this case) as well as by other sources like power
plants. The Act has successfully cut emissions of many pollutants, and it can do the
same for greenhouse gases.").
52
See Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, Diesel, supra note 2, at 412-21 (discussing modeling issues).
"On greenhouse gases there will be many important assumptions necessary to
make the models work. In particular, the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and mobile sources is different than the relationship between many other
pollutants and mobile sources. For example, many pollutants (e.g. particulates) are
the result of incomplete combustion. Pollution sources can become cleaner with
respect to these by increasing the efficiency of combustion or by preventing the
pollutants from leaving the combustion system (as through the catalytic converters
on U.S. automobiles). Greenhouse gases, however, are the product of combustion.
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Massachusettsv. EPA was to gain states the ability to regulate green-

house gases independently. To the extent they are able to do so
before EPA acts-and everyone agrees that EPA will move slowly
to implement the decision in this case and even more slowly to
extend its regulatory reach to greenhouse gases in other areasthese states will establish "facts on the ground" that EPA will likely
have to recognize in its modeling.
Second, the statute distinguishes between stationary and mobile
sources in important ways. While state and federal governments
share responsibility for regulating emissions from both, the federal
government has most of the authority in the area of mobile sources.
The federal government has the authority to mandate what technology auto and truck makers use to reduce pollution. States have only
three means of affecting these: they can institute inspection and
maintenance ("I&M") programs that ensure engines and exhaust
systems are operating properly, restrict the use of mobile sources
(i.e. tell people they can't drive as much), and require cars sold in
their states to meet the California emissions standards rather than
the federal standards." The first two of these options are extremely
unpopular. When EPA convinced Ohio to adopt an I&M program,
it provoked a political backlash that led the state government to pay
for the inspection costs rather than charging car owners as it had
done." Driving restrictions are a complete non-starter politically.
Not only are there relatively few ways to reduce their emission without replacing the
internal combustion engine (and even alternatives like electric vehicles still produce
greenhouse gas emissions at the powerplants that charge them), but the most important technology for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from an internal combustion
engine is improving fuel efficiency. As fuel efficiency increases, however, the cost
of operating a vehicle falls and so actual use may increase, reducing the net reduction
in greenhouse gas emissions.
One additional option to control mobile source emissions is to regulate fuel formulation, something EPA, the states, and even some local governments are already doing.
See Andrew P. Morriss & Nathaniel Stewart, Market Fragmenting Regulation: Why
Gasoline Costs So Much (And Why It's Going to Cost More), 72 Brook. L. Rev. 939,
1021-35 (2007). We may already be reaching the limits of emissions gains possible
through this means, however, and the costs of increasing the complexity of fuel
formulation to consumers are starting to be recognized.
ICalifornia's emission control legislation predated the federal limits and so it was
permitted to continue to have a separate set of standards. In 1990, the federal statute
was amended to permit other states to adopt the California standards.
5
1 Todd A. Stewart, E-Check: A Dirty Word in Ohio's Clean Air Debate-Ohio's
Battle Over Automobile Emissions Testing, 29 Cap. U.L. Rev. 265 (2001); Tieran Lewis,
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The result is that states can do little to affect their mobile source
emissions. Once EPA's computer model analyzes both the stationary
and mobile source emissions and makes a prediction of the pollution
levels due to mobile sources, any reductions needed to meet the
federally mandated ambient air quality standards are left to the
states to discover.
For understanding Massachusetts v. EPA, the key points are that
mobile sources are major sources of greenhouse gas emissions and
that the politically feasible set of regulatory measures that can limit
their emissions available to states is vanishingly small. What states
interested in reducing greenhouse gas emissions need, therefore,
is for EPA to impose a technological solution on greenhouse gas
emissions on car and truck manufacturers and to give states plenty
of credit in EPA's mobile source emission model for that technology
(irrespective of whether the technology actually reduces emissions.)"
States that want to address climate change need this because they
have few other means of addressing mobile source emissions of
greenhouse gases. The decision in this case moved them considerably
closer to that goal.
VIII. The Politics of Climate Change and the Courts
The roster of states participating on both sides of Massachusetts v.
EPA tells a great deal about the politics of climate change regulation.
Joining Massachusetts in demanding that EPA address mobile
source emissions of greenhouse gases were eleven states and the
District of Columbia; opposing were ten states. Using federal Energy
Information Administration data," I calculated the ratio of fossil
fuel energy production (coal, natural gas, and petroleum) in each
jurisdiction to its total energy use. The ratio is evidence of a state's
economic interest in continuing hydrocarbon energy use; a low
(high) ratio suggests that a state would benefit (lose) economically
relative to other states if greenhouse gas emissions were regulated,
Governor's E-Check Veto Concerns Some Residents, Daily Kent Stater (July 17, 2007)
(elimination of fees).
s"See Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, Diesel, supra note 2, at 480-81 (discussing mobile
source model problems in dealing with ozone levels and nitrogen oxide emissions).
7
1 Energy Information Administration, Table Si-Energy Consumption Estimates
by Source and End-Use Sector, 2004, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
states/sepsum/plainJitml/sun.btu...html (last visited August 12, 2007).
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since its energy sector would suffer a comparative advantage
(disadvantage).
Of the states demanding that EPA regulate, all but one are at or
below the median ratio of hydrocarbon energy use to total energy
use and six are among the ten with the lowest ratios. New Mexico,
the one exception, has a governor running for the Democratic nomination for president, a campaign in which demonstrating one's environmental credentials is important. Of the ten states opposing regulation, eight are above the median ratio; only Idaho and South Dakota
are below it. If we examine the percentage of energy states produce
from non-nuclear, non-hydrocarbon sources, we find a similar pattern. Eleven U.S. states produced ten percent or more of their energy
from such sources in 2004 (thirty-three produced five percent or
less). Of those eleven, five supported Massachusetts (California,
Washington, Oregon, Maine, Vermont) and only two (Idaho and
South Dakota) supported EPA.'
IX. Consequences for the Future
That states have different economic interests is true with respect
to many dimensions of federal policy-and the potential for conflict
over such differences was a concern of the Founders in their design
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court was not the forum the
Founders anticipated would resolve those differences; the political
branches were. By weakening standing rules, the Court's decision
in Massachusettsv. EPA threw the door wide open for states dissatisfied with the outcome of the political process to seek redress in
the courts.
Whether or not the federal government should be regulating
mobile source (or any other) emissions of greenhouse gases is fundamentally a political question. Unlike many of the air pollution issues
of the past, regulating greenhouse gases would insert EPA into
virtually every aspect of human activity. Indeed, it is hard to conceive
of an economic activity that does not result in at least the production
of greenhouse gases, whether from transportation of products and
"A similar division of interests among states existed in the federal nuisance suit
(since dismissed) by primarily Northeastern states over power plant greenhouse gas
emissions. The plaintiff states sued primarily utilities in the Midwest and South, not
in their own states. See Connecticut et al. v. American Electric Power Co. et al., No.
04-cv-05569, 2005 WL 2249748 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2005).
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raw materials for manufacturing or air travel and electricity use for
service industries. Climate change is thus the Holy Grail for those
seeking to expand state authority over the economy as it justifies
regulating everything.
Perhaps most alarmingly, Justice Stevens's analysis essentially
reduces to an assertion that the regulatory state must be able to
respond to what he sees as a crisis of the magnitude of climate
change because somebody needs to do something. Nowhere in Justice
Stevens's opinion is there any sense that he believes that Congress
can only act when it has been allocated the power to do so by
the Constitution or that an agency's mandate might not include
addressing a problem not known at the time the agency's authority
was established. The reader is left with the impression that Justice
Stevens cannot imagine that no one has the authority to address a
problem if the problem is large enough.
Of course, it would be the height of folly to rely on Congress or
a regulatory agency for the protection of liberty. That is why we
have the separation of powers, among other features of the national
government. But the political process does offer some protection
from government over-reaching in circumstances like these. Regulating greenhouse gas emissions is likely to be extremely costly because
of their ubiquity in economic activity.60 In a debate over the costs
and benefits of such regulations, it seems likely that imposing those
costs on the American public generally would be the preference,
intensely felt, of a minority of Americans, while the majority would
be resistant to bearing the economic impact of action without greater
assurance that other nations would also address the issue or that
waiting for technological improvements would not substantially
lower the costs. If that debate occurred in Congress, there would be
an opportunity for those who see global warming as a crisis requiring
immediate action and for those who think differently to make their
respective cases. A vigorous debate over everything from the underlying science to the most cost-effective regulatory approaches would
"Politicians can benefit as well, since the threat of regulation alone is often remarkably lucrative. See Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion (1997).
60
See House of Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs, The Economics of
Climate Change, vol. I, HL Paper 12-I (2005) (reviewing economic issues surrounding
climate change).
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ensue. The result might not be less regulation, indeed it could be
more," but the prospect of being held accountable at the polls for
either refusing to act or imposing unnecessary costs would give
individual members of Congress a reason to consider their actions
carefully. While far from perfect, the political process would force
the choices into the public eye.
Both directly (by giving EPA little choice but to enter the greenhouse gas regulation arena) and indirectly (by making it easier for
states and interest groups to push the regulatory state to expand
through the relaxation of the requirements for standing), Massachusetts v. EPA is a major step away from limited government. As a

result of this shift to a world where regulatory policy is determined
by and through litigation, economic freedoms are likely to become
increasingly scarce.

61
See David Schoenbrod, Remarks to the National Resource Defense Council, 20
Cardozo L. Rev. 767 (1999).
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